EOS Crisis Redux: Community Lambasts Foundation for Exit Scam

Original Article Title: "Vaulta Foundation's Downfall: Price Crash, Missing Audit, and Community Trust Collapse"

Original Article Author: MMK (@mmk_btc), Vaulta Community Member

Original Article Editor: Motion Xiaogong, Motion BlockBeats

Editor's Note:

Many are familiar with the high-profile $4.2 billion funding 7 years ago, for what was considered the early "Ethereum Killer" EOS. However, what many do not know is that after BM was ousted from EOS, the parent company Block.one took the previously raised funds and shifted focus to building the IPO trading platform Bullish.

The remaining EOS was taken over by the EOS Network Foundation, led by CEO Yves La Rose, affectionately known as "The Big Beard" by the community due to his thick beard. Subsequently, under The Big Beard's leadership, EOS was rebranded as Vaulta, pivoting towards the Web3 banking business, and the EOS Network Foundation was also renamed as the Vaulta Foundation. However, The Big Beard's sudden resignation has recently sparked community dissatisfaction, leading to accusations of various past actions.

The Vaulta Foundation (formerly EOS Network Foundation) is currently experiencing an unprecedented collapse of trust: burning tens of millions of dollars over four years while the coin price hits new lows; projects failing one after another, with the ledger going from public to discontinued; key management figures resigning "gracefully," yet delaying the handover of authority... This article will uncover the mysteries of Vaulta and tell the tale of a project's demise.

Yves Resignation: Graceful Exit or Behind-the-Scenes Power Play?

On November 12, 2025, Yves La Rose, former CEO of the Vaulta Foundation (formerly EOS Network Foundation, hereinafter referred to as VF), suddenly posted a resignation statement on Platform X, stating that he had informed the network's 21 block producers on October 29 of his voluntary resignation and the election of new representatives through on-chain governance. The statement was dignified in tone, filled with expressions of "gratitude" and "vision." However, to the community's surprise four weeks later, it was discovered that the Vaulta core multisig account was still under Yves' control, with no handover in sight.

Yves's Personal Resignation Statement

Furthermore, after resigning, Yves worked behind the scenes to push Greymass founder Aaron Cox to take over his position. As a result, Aaron was thrust into the spotlight with a massive proposal of 10 million $A (EOS) to continue funding the core development budget. This move sparked widespread community questioning: was this simply a "head swap" to prolong the project, effectively transferring remaining public funds.

Charge One: Lavish Spending, Marketing Expenditure Shrouded in Mystery

Since VF was established in 2021, ecosystem development has not accelerated with time.

On the contrary, what the community has seen is another unsettling trend: the budget has expanded year by year, while the results have diminished year by year.

Under the guise of "ecosystem revitalization," VF launched a market expansion plan in 2022–2023. VF did recruit an excellent marketing team, and they also made efforts in brand operations and international events.

But the key question is—what has all this lavish spending brought?

According to nine disclosed quarterly reports, the sole marketing-related expenses (PR & Marketing) reached: in 2022 Q4, a staggering $1,709,800 for marketing expenditures; in 2023 Q1, another $1,072,887 spent.

In just 6 months, nearly $2.8 million was poured into brand promotion and public relations activities. However, the community only saw: attendance numbers at events, photos, and reports; Twitter follower growth; 2000 days without downtime; EVM performance tests;

These data are not meaningless, but they resemble more of a PR slideshow rather than the actual state of the ecosystem. Developer growth? Lacking. Daily on-chain activities? Undisclosed. TVL? Almost non-existent. Why does the more spent, the lower the community's perception? When all reports only talk about "highlights" and not about "results," transparency naturally slides into opacity.

Charge Two: Instant Money Flow Upon Taking Office, Greymass's $5 Million Budget Controversy Continues

In June 2024, VF allocated $15 million (EOS) to establish the "Middleware Special Fund," with the first batch of $5 million (EOS) being allocated to the Greymass team, and the remaining $10 million currently held in the eosio.mware account.

On-chain data shows: The funds were transferred from the foundation's eosio.mware account to an account newly created by Greymass called uxuiuxuiuxui; subsequently, this wallet made monthly transfers to the http://funds.gm account, with a memo of "Operation + USD/CAD price," resembling a "salary payment"; then, http://funds.gm transferred to http://rewards.gm, finally distributing to several accounts such as jesta, inconsistent, http://apporc.gm, with transfer records annotated with "Reward Payout + USD amount"; most of the salaried accounts swiftly cashed out by transferring to exchanges like krakenkraken or Coinbase post-receipt.

rewards.gm On-chain Transfer Records ( Data Source)

Additional Information: The "Middleware" built by Greymass refers to the foundational infrastructure tools that simplify the account creation and interaction processes.

Despite the Greymass team issuing several development updates early in the allocation period, there have been almost no technical accomplishments or periodic summaries released in the past year. Particularly, Greymass's middleware tools still face many technical issues in compatibility and stability and have not been widely adopted by mainstream developers.

The community's focal point of criticism is: Does the $5 million (EOS) allocation involve duplicate salaries, unidentified accounts receiving salaries, or other opaque behaviors? Does the fund disbursement closely coincide with Aaron's assumption of office, raising suspicions of a "self-approval budget"? Does the salary payment structure lack third-party oversight? We do not deny the contributions Greymass has made to the ecosystem or Aaron's early technical reputation. However, have they been misled in the new policy? Have they deviated from the original development intent in the absence of supervision?

These issues have yet to be resolved.

It can be confirmed that the silence and low productivity of the "Greymass Five Million Project" have made it difficult to respond to an external trust crisis, further exacerbating the community's questioning of the Foundation's fund usage legitimacy.

Charge Three: Coin Price Plummet, Foundation "Silent," Accountability Became a Blind Spot

If technical achievements can be disputed and marketing effects quantified, then the token price is the most honest indicator.

This year, $A (EOS) has plummeted all the way, hitting a low of $0.21—a signal dangerous enough to put any ecosystem in a red alert. However, as the community continues to inquire, the Foundation's response has always been: "The coin price is not within the Foundation's scope of responsibility."

This statement itself is irrefutable.

A technical organization is not obliged to manipulate the market. But the contradiction lies in the fact that when all ecosystem indicators are declining and community confidence is collapsing, the Foundation has not had any discussion of "stability expectations" or "market support mechanisms."

What followed were even more unsettling actions: the Foundation announced its "dissolution," with no roadmap or transition plan.

The community's question is not whether the Foundation should be responsible for the coin price, but: at a critical moment when the ecosystem is facing a trust crisis, why choose to withdraw: is it due to incapacity, indifference, or some issues that are inconvenient to face? Accountability has disappeared in this crash.

Charge Four: From Weekly Updates to Silence, Transparency Disappeared Quietly

When VF was first established, transparency was once its biggest selling point.

2021: Weekly updates (Everything EOS Weekly Report), providing real-time progress reports to the community;

2022: Monthly report (Monthly Yield Report), slacking off for a few months, but still acceptable;

2023: Quarterly report (ENF Quarterly Report)

2024: Silence... ...

2025: Silence... ...

From the reported data, VF's expenditure was the highest in the fourth quarter of 2022, reaching $7,885,340; subsequent quarterly expenses gradually declined.

However, these reports often only disclose the total amount, lacking detailed categorization and specifics, making it difficult for outsiders to judge the fund's destination. The community has long had doubts about massive spending and lack of transparency.

The report repeatedly mentions programs such as the Grant Framework and Pomelo, which experienced a phased "shutdown" in 2023; at the same time, the whitepaper's commitment to project-specific fund management has not been meticulously executed or publicly settled, and the destination of funds allocated to exchanges remains a mystery.

This breakdown in transparency, coupled with years of extravagance, eventually led to a rock-bottom community confidence.

From intense disclosure to gradual scarcity, and now to complete silence, the disappearance of transparency is almost perfectly synchronized with the ecological heat curve.

More notably: since Q1 of 2024, no financial reports have been published. There are no financial audits, no budget distributions, no project lists, and no outstanding allocations.

The community has been forced to accept one fact: the Foundation's operations have shifted from "high-frequency transparency" to a "complete black box."

Simultaneously, many of VF's high-profile projects that were once touted for collaboration have mostly stalled at the "communication stage," lacking practical implementation. The promised "operational transparency" has ultimately become a silent cliff.

Charge Five: Arbitrary Allocation, Grants Have Become a "Black Hole," and No One Knows Where the Money Went

Looking back at the Foundation's early days, VF did indeed attempt to rebuild the Vaulta (EOS) ecosystem through various grant programs, including the Grant Framework, Recognition Grants, and the public grant pool used in conjunction with Pomelo.

At that stage, the speed of fund disbursement was fast, and the scale was large, with the intention of "stopping the bleeding quickly."

We cannot deny that they did play a role in boosting morale in the early stages.

Here is an additional note on Grants: VF's allocations are divided into the publicly recruited "Grant Framework" (milestone-based allocations), targeting individuals, teams, or companies, mostly for technical projects; Recognition Grants (awards given to projects) and distributions to ecosystem projects through public grant channels like Pomelo. Funding can be used for both for-profit and public goods/charity projects.

For example—In the first report of Q4 2021, VF allocated in a single instance:

$3.5 million in Recognition Grants (an average of $100,000 per project);

$1.3M funding for five technical workgroups to write a whitepaper;

$1.265M support for the community governance organization EdenOnEOS;

$500K funding pool for the Pomelo inaugural season;

However, the issue lies in the fact that this is the only quarterly report in VF's entire four-year allocation that fully disclosed the recipients of the funding.

From Q4 2021 to Q4 2023, although Grants have consistently been the largest portion of quarterly expenditures (at times accounting for 40% to 60% of total spending), the reports no longer: disclose specific funding recipients; reveal the actual amount received by each project; disclose project acceptance status; mention detailed fund usage; explain if projects have achieved milestones;

In other words, while the numbers are still there, the information has disappeared.

Only the first quarterly report disclosed the flow of funds to each project. In the subsequent eight reports, Grants' funding expenditure continues to be the "biggest item," but no longer do they itemize the beneficiary projects or outcomes.

We can see how much money is spent, but no one ever knows where the money is going.

Has the funding truly driven the ecosystem? Has the money been used effectively? Have projects delivered? Why doesn't the foundation disclose more information?

It inevitably raises questions: Did the foundation start by lavishly spending money under the guise of "ecosystem funding"? Outwardly, it is to win over the community and buy people's hearts, but internally it holds inflation funds and reserves, lacking results and oversight.

The total amount in the VF matching pool exceeds tens of millions of dollars, but most projects have extremely rare updates, some even disappearing after receiving funds.

End of an Era

The Vaulta Foundation once promised governance reform with a "transparent, community-driven" approach but gradually moved towards closedness and corruption over the past four years.

From Yves' dignified resignation without handing over power, to the $5M (in EOS) middleware funding without accountability, from hundreds of thousands of dollars in quarterly marketing expenses with no effect, to the silence after ecosystem funding—this is not a failure of "decentralized governance" but a victory of "centralized plunder."

This long article is a list of charges and a warning document.

The collapse of Vaulta is not just the tragedy of EOS but also a microcosm of the trampling of the Web3 ideal.